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“‘But is a blurred concept a concept at all?’ - Is an indistinct photograph
a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace an
indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn’t the indistinct one often exactly what
we need?”
(Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 71)
In this paper, I direct Wittgenstein’s question about the (in-)desirability of sharp
boundaries of concepts to resilience research: does the latter exhibit conceptual vague-
ness, and, if so, is that beneﬁcial? Can looseness in concepts and meanings lend itself
to shedding light on unsolved problems? While resilience research has established that
redundancy is an asset for complex adaptive systems, does this ﬁnding also hold for
conceptual frameworks?
Resilience research integrates diﬀerent disciplines, research contexts and is concerned
with a variety of topics. Hence, it is not surprising that it sometimes appears as a vast
ﬁeld, fuzzy not only at the boundaries, but also within: “Resilience is a broad, multi-
faced, and loosely organized cluster of concepts, [...] a changing constellation of ideas
[...]” (Carpenter and Brock 2008: 1). More systematically, a literature survey (Brand
and Jax 2007) inventories the prevalent meanings of resilience in a typology comprising
ten (!) diﬀerent categories of concepts. However, not every individual research approach
relies on a vague conceptual scheme. There is a wide spectrum of resilience research
with respect to the degree of conceptual vagueness. On the precise end of this spectrum
lie speciﬁc approaches employing concise conceptualizations. Here, diﬀerent meanings
of resilience and their relation to other concepts are clearly observable. On the vague
end of the spectrum lies “resilience thinking”, a holistic perspective on human-nature
relationships (Folke et al. 2010, Kirchhoﬀ et al. 2010, Walker and Salt 2006). It ex-
pands the original ecological deﬁnition of resilience (Holling 1973) to encompass social
systems as well and complements it by a variety of other notions, such as adaptability,
transformability (Walker et al. 2004) or panarchy (Gunderson and Holling 2002).
When speaking of conceptual vagueness, I use vagueness in the linguistic, purely
2descriptive sense of the word: vagueness refers to the phenomenon of a term that has
several meanings which “have so much in common that it is diﬃcult to separate them”
(Tuggy 1993: 273). In contrast, polysemy refers to a term whose several meanings are
similar but separable and ambiguity to a term whose several meanings have “little or
nothing in common beyond the phonological structure they share” (ibid.). Although
these categories themselves are vague because borderline cases may exist, they are help-
ful in shaping the focus of this paper: I am not concerned with ambiguity since I ignore
meanings from completely diﬀerent contexts, such as psychological resilience during
childhood development. Rather, I concentrate on resilience in social-ecological systems
and present how conceptually precise research establishes a polysemous concept of re-
silience whereas “resilience thinking” is based on a vague concept of resilience.
While ecology regularly discusses wether conceptual precision is found wanting in its
discipline (McCoy and Shrader-Frechette 1992, Odenbaugh 2001, Davis and Thompson
2001, Hodges 2008a, Jax 2008, Hodges 2008b), resilience research has not yet payed
much attention to this question. This albeit resilience research roots in ecology and
comprises ecology as an important part. Some scholars refer aﬃrmatively (Carpenter
and Brock 2008) to the conceptual variety in resilience research, others are concerned
about dilution of the original ecological concept of resilience (Brand and Jax 2007), yet a
systematic discussion about the potential beneﬁts or damages from vagueness is lacking
in resilience research.
In order to ﬁll this gap, I contrast two conﬂicting positions within philosophy of
science concerning the importance of conceptual precision.1 On the one hand, I set out
the traditional view of science that emphasizes precision and conceptual clarity as pre-
condition for empirical science. This view relegates all vague concepts and statements to
the realm of pseudo-science and belief. On the other hand, I present an alternative view
that highlights the merits of vagueness as fuel for creativity, means of communication
1I am not interested in the manifold disputes in philosophy and cognitive science whether concepts
are objects or abilities, mental representations or abstract entities and so forth. I leave it at the
observation that “[c]oncepts, pretheoretically, are the constituents of thoughts (Margolis and Laurence
2006)” and focus on the methodological question whether scientiﬁc concepts should be vague.
3across disciplinary boundaries and part of pragmatic problem-solving.
Discussing the implications of this methodological dispute for resilience research,
I propose that the advantages of precision and vagueness constitute a trade-oﬀ. A
universal solution to this trade-oﬀ that perfectly balances the beneﬁts and problems of
conceptual vagueness may not exist. Rather, the trade-oﬀ may be solved diﬀerently
depending on the speciﬁc context of resilience research. By consciously approaching the
trade-oﬀ and giving explicit justiﬁcation for a particular solution, inappropriate degrees
of vagueness/precision could be avoided.
Assessing the speciﬁc case of “resilience thinking”, I argue that it currently does
not display a consistent balance between vagueness and precision. “Resilience thinking”
includes several other notions, such as sustainability, adaptability and transformability,
which circle around resilience as a core concept (Folke et al. 2010) and which are of-
ten vaguely normative (Nykvist 2011). I suggest that a more structured organization
of the concepts and an explicit distinction between descriptive and normative content
would enhance the vagueness/precision trade-oﬀ in “resilience thinking”. By relating
the concepts of resilience, sustainability, adaptability and transfomability in analogy
to the approach of transdisciplinary research (Hirsch Hadorn et al. 2006), I show how
“resilience thinking” could handle the beneﬁts and dangers of conceptual vagueness in
a coherent way.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, I give an introduction to the wide
spectrum of current resilience research. In Section 3, I present arguments from philoso-
phy of science in favor and against conceptual vagueness. I discuss the implications of
this methodological dispute in Section 4 and propose a restructuring of the “resilience
thinking” conceptual framework. Finally, in Section 5, I summarize and conclude.
2 Resilience research: a wide spectrum
First, I present research that relies on a very precise and narrow concept of resilience.
Second, I sketch the approach of “resilience thinking” which subsumes a cluster of
concepts under a vague notion of resilience. In doing so, I set out the extreme end-points
4of the whole spectrum of resilience research with respect to the degree of conceptual
vagueness/precision.
2.1 Precise concepts
Rather than giving an encompassing literature overview, which recently has been pro-
vided in form of a typology (Brand and Jax 2007), I present the distinctiveness of precise
concepts of resilience in an exemplary manner. I highlight three diﬀerent ways of framing
a concise notion of resilience.
First, Pimm’s (1984: 322) well-known concept of resilience refers to the time a
system needs to recover from a disturbance: “How fast the variables return towards
their equilibrium following a perturbation.” This deﬁnition is applicable only to stable
systems with one equilibrium. It is a precise, one-dimensional measure. The faster a
systems returns to equilibrium, the larger its resilience.
Second, building on general thoughts of how to apply economic reasoning to non-
linear ecosystems (Dasgupta and M¨ aler 2003), M¨ aler et al. (2007, 2009) develop an
approach to determine the economic value of resilience. To that aim, they deﬁne re-
silience theoretically as a stock variable where the height of the stock is equivalent to
the system’s resilience. Applied to the problem of salinization in South-East Australia,
they operationalize resilience as the distance of the groundwater table from a critical
threshold value. Hence, resilience ﬁgures as a precise, one-dimensional measure. The
bigger the groundwater table’s distance to the critical salinization level, the bigger the
system’s resilience.
Third, Derissen et al. (2011: 10) deﬁne resilience in a relative way. They ask wether
an ecological-economic system is persistent relative to a speciﬁc disturbance: a given
state of a system is called resilient with respect to a speciﬁc disturbance “if and only if
the disturbed system is in the same domain of attraction in which the system has been
at the time of disturbance”. Hence, the question wether a system is resilient or not
can only be evaluated after a disturbance has occurred. Resilience, in this view, is an
ex-post description of a dynamic system’s trajectory. It is coupled to a precise, formally
5speciﬁed condition. This implies that resilience is not continuously measurable - either
the condition is met and the system is resilient or the system fails to comply with the
condition and is deemed not resilient. Thus, resilience boils down to a 0/1 decision.
These are three, concise deﬁnitions of resilience. In some respects they are similar, in
others they show diﬀerences: In the ﬁrst and second concept, resilience is continuously
measurable, in the third it is a 0/1 decision. In the ﬁrst and third concept, the resilience
of a system is determined ex-post, after some perturbation occurred, in the second
concept, current resilience is assessed in order to determine the consequences of future
disturbances. Finally, concepts two and three are inspired by Holling’s (1973) notion of
resilience, whereas the ﬁrst concept is not.
In sum, at the precise end of resilience research, diﬀerent research questions yield the
appropriate speciﬁc deﬁnitions, which partly overlap in structure. Crucially, the similar-
ities and diﬀerences between these precise deﬁnitions are clearly observable. Resilience,
then, is a polysemous concept in that its “meanings are clearly distinguishable, yet
clearly related” (Tuggy 1993: 273). The possibility to clearly distinguish one meaning
from another is what separates precise conceptual frameworks of resilience research from
the vague cluster of concepts of “resilience thinking” presented in the next subsection.
2.2 Resilience thinking: a cluster of concepts
The perspective of “[r]esilience thinking addresses the dynamics and development of
complex social-ecological systems” (Folke et al. 2010: 1). Here, “addressing” refers
not only to scientiﬁc apprehending for “resilience thinking” is more than a research
program. It is also a resource-management approach and a view of the world that is
not necessarily tied to scientiﬁc discourse and academic institutions (Walker and Salt
2006). “Resilience thinking” moves away from the speciﬁc question “resilience of what
to what?” (Carpenter et al. 2001) and puts more emphasis on the qualities of the state
of mind denoted by “resilience thinking” (Folke et al. 2010). Consequently, there is a
whole cluster of concepts gathering under the umbrella “resilience thinking”.
In the following, I present four characteristics that mark “resilience thinking” as
6vague extreme of the resilience research spectrum. “Resilience thinking” displays blurred
boundaries of concepts (1), redundancy (2), metaphors (3) and mixing of normative and
positive aspects (4).
First, several other concepts are suggested as complementary to resilience. The
boundaries between these concepts are blurred. Consider, for example, adaptability and
transformability – concepts that are proposed as prerequisites for resilience (Walker et
al. 2004, Folke et al. 2010). Adaptability is often deﬁned as “the capacity of actors to
inﬂuence resilience”, transformability as “the capacity to transform the stability land-
scape itself to become a diﬀerent kind of system” (Folke et al. 2010: 3). However,
the boundaries between these concepts are not clear, since the capacities evoked in the
deﬁnitions are roughly the same - both on the empirical as well as on the conceptual
level. Empirically, adaptability and transformability of a social-ecological system rely
on similar characteristics as resilience, such as institutional diversity, learning possibil-
ities or openness to experimental change (Folke et al. 2010: 5). Thus, rather than
being an empirically grounded distinction, the diﬀerence between resilience, adaptabil-
ity and transformability ﬁgures as a conceptual categorization. On the conceptual level,
however, the concepts’ boundaries are also blurred: one way to inﬂuence a system’s
resilience (=adaptability) consists in changing the topology of the stability landscape
(Walker et al. 2004). Then again, the ability to create and frame new stability basins is
critical to manage fundamental change in social-ecological systems (=transformability).
It seems that transformability is some kind of super-adaptability, where adaptability
refers to small changes in the stability landscape’s topology and transformability to
large changes. The boundary between small and large changes is, of course, hard to pin
down (Walker et al. 2004: 2). In sum, resilience, adaptability and transformability are
presented as closely related concepts, which cannot be precisely separated, neither on
the empirical, nor on the conceptual level.
Second, not only are the boundaries between concepts blurred, but also is there
redundancy. That is, concepts overlap in meaning up to the point of complete congru-
ency. The use of the concepts of resilience and adaptability illustrates. Consider, for
instance, common deﬁnitions of adaptive capacity as one aspect of resilience (Carpenter
7and Brock 2008, Folke et al. 2010). This component is often related to “learning, ﬂexi-
bility to experiment and adopt novel solutions” (Walker et al. 2002: 6). Following this
view, it would seem reasonable to understand adaptive capacity as (i) being delineated
as an exclusively human attribute and (ii) being one component of the main concept of
social-ecological resilience. However, the concepts are also used in ways contradicting
both (i) and (ii). Contra (i), for instance, Scheﬀer (2009: 103) writes : “In ecosystems,
adaptive capacity is determined largely by the (response) diversity of species”. In this
perspective, adaptive capacity no longer exclusively represents human capabilities but it
appears as an encompassing social-ecological concept. Contra (ii), for instance, Bierman
et al. (2010: 284) indicate “adaptiveness” as an “umbrella concept for a set of related
concepts”, among them resilience. In other words, adaptive capacity and resilience seem
to mutually contain each other and converge to one concept that addresses all attributes
of social-ecological systems.
Third, “resilience thinking” includes two metaphorical concepts, “adaptive cycle”
and “panarchy” (Gunderson and Holling 2002). Both metaphors refer to distinct cat-
egories that, following “resilience thinking”, are crucial for the resilience of complex,
adaptive systems. The adaptive cycle notion highlights the time dimension of “resilience
thinking” as a forward-looking conceptual mindset. The metaphor serves to counter a
possible conservative connotation of resilience as a backward-looking concept aiming at
persistence of the status-quo. Hence, it emphasizes working with change, transforma-
tion and the adaptive cycle’s circulation through diﬀerent phases. The panarchy notion
highlights the spatial dimension of resilience and the importance of scales below and
above the system in question. In contrast to a hierarchy that is organized in a top-down
fashion, the panarchy metaphor indicates that in dynamic systems, no level is prefer-
ential. Albeit these metaphors do not come down to a single hypothesis, they serve as
“heuristic models” (Folke et al. 2010) that structure research.
Fourth, “resilience thinking” mixes normative and positive aspects. While resilience
was introduced as a purely descriptive concept (Holling 1973), “resilience thinking” now
carries heavy normative content (Brand and Jax 2007, Nykvist 2011). In other words,
“resilience thinking” replaced an initially “thin” concept of resilience with a “thick”
8concept that mixes both description and evaluation (Williams 1985). Contrariwise, the
inﬂuence of the normative notion of sustainability is fading in “resilience thinking”.
Sustainability used to ﬁgure prominently within the resilience research discourse (e.g.,
Common and Perrings 1992, Holling et al. 2002b), representing a guiding principle, or
meta-concept above resilience and its attributes. By now, “resilience thinking” substi-
tutes the normative content of sustainability. Folke et al. (2010), while introducing
“resilience thinking”, do not refer to sustainability at all (!); instead, they endow “re-
silience thinking” with an additional normative streak in the form of “Earth system
resilience”. The latter aims at preventing a global transition out of the Holocene, the
current stable climate conﬁguration on Earth (Folke et al. 2010: 2). This idea of “Earth
system resilience” – keeping our planet in a favorable stability domain – replaces sus-
tainability as normative anchor and orientation point.
In sum, at the vague end of resilience research lies the cluster of concepts called “re-
silience thinking”. Individual meanings inside this cluster are not clearly distinguishable,
partly redundant, metaphorical and evaluative.
3 Conceptual vagueness vs. precision
In the following, I turn to philosophy of science and the question wether conceptual
vagueness is an asset. I ﬁrst set out the “traditional” view of science that emphasizes
precision and conceptual clarity. Then, I present the arguments highlighting the merits
of vagueness that stem from various attacks on this “traditional” view.
3.1 Precision
In traditional philosophy of science, several arguments back the claim that conceptual
clarity is essential for scientiﬁc research: (P 1) Conceptual precision sets science apart
from faith. (P 2) Precise concepts reveal the limits of their validity. (P 3) Empirical
testability necessarily presupposes conceptual precision. I will put forward arguments (P
1) and (P 2) by presenting Max Weber’s reasoning. Subsequently, I introduce two ratio-
nalizations of argument (P 3) by presenting the dispute between the logical empiricists
9of the Vienna Circle and Karl Popper.
First, consider Weber’s argument for conceptual precision as the main virtue of a
researcher. Weber argues that scientists make value-judgments when choosing on how
to deal with the “inﬁnite multiplicity of successively and coexistently emerging and dis-
appearing events” (Weber 1949: 72). The researcher’s perspective is no less subjective
than the individual actions she intends to explain. The establishment of ends-means
relationships as a basis for understanding human actions is an inherently value-laden
activity. Therefore, the researcher must state her own perspective as clearly as possi-
ble. She needs to disclose her own starting-point in order to separate her subjective
value-judgments from the empirical knowledge delivered by the respective analysis. In
other words, total Wertfreiheit (“value-freedom”) is impossible. Albeit the researcher
should strive to distinguish her subjective view from empirical facts, she cannot attain
a perspective-free point from where to conduct research. Value-judgments are unavoid-
able. They should be clearly indicated and recognizable as such – for if they are not
made explicitly up front, they silently enter subsequent research. It is only a “hair-line
which separates science from faith” (Weber [1904] 1949: 110). Hence, it is of utter-
most importance for the researcher to make the normative foundation of her conceptual
framework as explicit as possible.
Second, Weber argues that conceptual clarity is necessary to be aware of a concept’s
limits. In contrast, failing to clarify one’s perspective and assumptions obfuscates the
merits of a given research approach. Only by means of clear conceptual boundaries can
the limits of produced empirical knowledge be established. Only by concise delineation
of a concept’s content can its applicability be judged. That reality is complex and multi-
layered should not be a pretext for using soft and blurred concepts that accommodate
reality more easily. Very broad concepts may tempt researchers to believe the concepts
could explain everything. Then, however, they explain nothing. Weber concludes:
“...the construction of sharp and unambiguous concepts relevant to the
concrete individual viewpoint which directs our interest at any given time,
aﬀords the possibility of clearly realizing the limits of their validity.” (Weber
[1904] 1949: 107)
10Hence, Weber suggests abstract Idealtypen (ideal types) which serve as instruments to
structure social reality. Whether these theoretical constructs are mere intellectual games
or useful categories cannot be determined a priori. It is through their capacity to provide
meaningful empirical knowledge that they reveal their validity.
Third, the relationship between theories, concepts and the empirical world is at the
core of the reasoning of the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle and their critic
Popper. Both sides contend that without conceptual precision, no scientiﬁc theory can
be empirically tested, thereby losing its scientiﬁc status. Basically, both the logical
empiricists as well as Popper build their philosophies of science on the dictum of 19th
century physicist Mach (1960: 587) that “where neither conﬁrmation nor refutation is
possible, science is not concerned.” Hence, seeking empirical validation constitutes the
heart of science.
In their assault on metaphysics, Schlick, Carnap and other thinkers of the Vienna
Circle reject any statement that belongs neither to the realm of logic nor to the realm of
empirical science. That is, they dismiss any statement which is neither a priori analytical
nor a posteriori synthetical as meaningless. Since they consider logical or mathemati-
cal statements as tautological, their main interest consists in providing a criterion for
empirical signiﬁcance. That criterion is found in the possibility of veriﬁcation: either a
statement is veriﬁable in principle or it refers only to a pseudo-problem.2 The logical
empiricists radicalize this reasoning to the point that meaning and possibility of veri-
ﬁcation are equalized. They contend that the only appropriate answer to the question
“What does statement X mean?” is to indicate a procedure by which X could be em-
pirically tested. Hence, veriﬁability serves as criterion by which all relevant statements
can be distinguished from meaningless statements:
“The dividing line between logical possibility and impossibility of veriﬁca-
tion is absolutely sharp and distinct; there is no gradual transition between
meaning and nonsense. For either you have given the grammatical rules
2The point is not that a statement has to be positively conﬁrmed to bear meaning but that you
have to be able to denote a procedure by which it could be empirically veriﬁed.
11for veriﬁcation, or you have not; tertium non datur.” (Schlick 1936: 352,
emphasis in original)
Following this reasoning, conceptual precision is crucial for empirical meaningfulness.
Vague statements may easily be veriﬁed and are trivially true. Only sharp propositions
can be put to a real empirical test. Logical empiricism dismisses any gray area between
veriﬁable and meaningless statements and aims at discarding the latter. If all pseudo-
problems are dismissed, empirical science can do its job:
“Neatness and clarity are striven for, and dark distances and unfathomable
depths rejected. [...] Clariﬁcation of the traditional philosophical problems
leads us partly to unmask them as pseudo-problems, and partly to transform
them into empirical problems and thereby subject them to the judgment of
experimental science.“ (Carnap et al. [1929] 1973: 306)
Whereas Popper rejects veriﬁcation as criterion of meaning, he agrees with the Vi-
enna Circle on a very fundamental level: Science strives for empirical validation which
implies conceptual precision as a precondition. Empirical validation, for Popper, is not
positively possible. Hypotheses can never be logically veriﬁed, only refuted by empirical
tests. Hence, Popper substitutes falsiﬁability for veriﬁability. The degree of falsiﬁa-
bility indicates a theory’s quality: “Every “good” scientiﬁc theory is a prohibition: it
forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is” (Popper
1963: 36). Falsiﬁability, in turn, increases in the degree of clarity and precision of a
theory (Popper 1959). Vague theories are more diﬃcult to falsify than clearly stated
ones because vague concepts and hypotheses are easily reconciled with whatever may
eventuate. Precise statements, in contrast, exhibit a higher probability of being refuted
since they yield a much higher set of events that are prohibited. Thus, vagueness in
concepts is bad science – as it accommodates reality more easily, vagueness impedes the
scientiﬁc progress which relies on the trial-and-error mechanism of repeated formulation
and refutation of hypotheses.
123.2 Vagueness
In contrast to the “traditional” view of science presented in the last Section, other
authors hold that that precision is not a precondition for good science or even that
conceptual vagueness is an asset. The arguments to support that claim can be sum-
marized as follows: (V 1) Creativity relies on open, vague language. (V 2) Inter- and
transdisciplinary communication may proﬁt from blurred concepts. (V 3) Problem-
solving requires participative processes rather than precise, abstract conceptualization.
I ﬁrst introduce argument (V 1) which ﬁgures most prominently in Feyerabend’s attack
on traditional philosophy of science. Then, I set out argument (V 2) by presenting
Wittgenstein’s classic discussion of blurred concepts and argument (V 3) by presenting
the recently emerging perspective of “post-normal” science.
First, in a famous attack against traditional philosophy of science, Feyerabend (1975,
1998) rejects the latter’s emphasis on precision, clarity and abstraction and highlights
vagueness as a source of creativity (cf. Hodges 2008a for a similar argument in the
ecological discussion). Feyerabend dismisses the traditional assumption of a superiority
of science and argues that there cannot be a decisive argument against other forms of
knowledge (possibly vague and inconsistent) that are incommensurable with science.
Just as the choice between competing scientiﬁc theories always includes a subjective
value-judgement, the choice between scientiﬁc knowledge and other forms cannot be
grounded on purely objective arguments. Hence, traditionally precise scientiﬁc concepts
and deﬁnitions are not a priori superior to others. On this reasoning builds Feyer-
abend’s (1998) case for vagueness as source of creativity. Every-day language is mostly
vague, in contrast to the traditional requirements for scientiﬁc language which Feyer-
abend dismisses in the ﬁrst place. He insists that there is no decisive, objective argument
in favor of “scientiﬁc standards” of precision and abstraction. To the contrary, science
looses its creative potential when it gets to obsessed with precise language and concep-
tual rigor. Every attempt to dispose of ambiguities is detrimental because open-minded,
creative thinking thrives on vagueness. The traditional quest for scientiﬁc rigor and ab-
solutely precise concepts, in Feyerabend’s view, may yield a deadlock instead of the
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tions is dependent on some degree of blurredness. While inconsistencies and ambiguities
traditionally are seen as ﬂaws to be eliminated, they are fuel for constructive, open-ended
science. A perfectly precise and closed conceptual scheme would rather terminate cre-
ativity and epistemic motivation than promote new research. Feyerabend (1998: 131,
own translation) concludes: “Thus, I would say that it is better to remain vague.”
Second, Wittgenstein (2009) insists that some concepts cannot be pinned down to a
single, concise deﬁnition but rather have a “family of meanings”. Wittgenstein’s example
is the question of how to explain to someone what a game is. It is not advisable, he
argues, to try to give an exact deﬁnition. Rather, some paradigmatic examples of games
give a better idea of the concept. For some special purpose, a precise deﬁnition may be
useful, but the concept game as a whole refers to a “family of meanings” and thus cannot
be squeezed into a single deﬁnition. In general, a vague concept with blurred boundaries
is more adaptable to diﬀerent cases. While employing a narrow deﬁnition gives a clear
justiﬁcation for using the respective term in that particular way, it couples the concept
to a special purpose and sharply restricts the concept’s applicability. By refusing to draw
exact boundaries, that is, avoiding a precise deﬁnition, the set of possible examples for
a concept is not circumscribed. Hence, it is easier to accommodate new members to the
family of meanings. While Wittgenstein makes his argument in a very general way, the
point easily transfers to philosophy of science. Precise deﬁnitions are appropriate for
the respective speciﬁc research purposes. Yet they are less adaptable to other cases and
purposes. This problem will be magniﬁed when a concept is used across disciplines and
outside the scientiﬁc discourse. Thus, inter- and transdisciplinary communication will
be easy when the diﬀerent participants are aware of the whole family of meanings; it will
be diﬃcult if each insists on a speciﬁc meaning and deﬁnition. For example, resilience as
a “boundary object” (Brand and Jax 2007) with less speciﬁc content and more openness
to usage in other contexts, facilitates inter- and transdisciplinary communication.
Third, while traditional views of science, like Weber’s presented in Section 3.1, call
for abstraction and rigor in order to achieve scientiﬁc certainty, the idea of “post-normal”
science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, 2003) challenges this quest for truth. The “post-
14normal” perspective questions the traditional assumption of science as an unbiased and
objective endeavor. In a “post-normal” world, research takes place in an environment
where decision stakes and uncertainty are high. Thus, the traditional aim of research,
truth, “...may be a luxury or indeed an irrelevance” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 2003: 653).
Rather, the “maintenance and enhancement of quality” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 2003:
653) is the appropriate aim of research. The shift to a “post-normal” perspective im-
plies that science no longer possesses the authority to provide hard inputs that guide
soft policy decisions. On the contrary, science becomes an equal participant in a public
discourse, where everyone who desires has a say and no one is morally or epistemically
superior. Science, in this “post-normal” view, engages in a mutually respectful dialogue
with stakeholders to solve pressing problems (Luks 1999). This dialogue does not nec-
essarily proﬁt from conceptual rigor and abstract, theoretical knowledge. In that vein,
Hirsch Hadorn et al. (2006: 125) argue that “knowledge achieved in transdisciplinary re-
search does not conform to the ideal of scientiﬁc knowledge as universal, explanatory and
proven.” High-quality problem-solving, then, is not equal to scientiﬁc “puzzle-solving”
and does not stem from the same source as traditional science. The traditional striving
for objective knowledge and conceptual precision might even be a hindrance for socially
inclusive problem-solving by obfuscating scientists’ own value-driven involvement in a
speciﬁc issue. It is not surprising, from this perspective, that scientiﬁc input sometimes
makes controversies even worse (Sarewitz 2004). “Post-normal” science should partici-
pate in public debate but it needs to be aware that it is only one voice amongst others
(Frame and Brown 2008) and that the traditional scientiﬁc goal of precise, objective
knowledge should not stand in the way of pragmatic problem-solving.
4 Assessment
Resilience research comes in a wide spectrum, ranging from approaches relying on concise
conceptualizations on the one hand, to the vague approach of “resilience thinking” on
the other hand (cf. Section 2). Both ways can draw on arguments from philosophy
of science (cf. Section 3). Does one side prevail? First, I argue that there is not
15a generally appropriate level of vagueness for resilience research. Rather, a trade-oﬀ
between vagueness and precision exists, which might be solved diﬀerently depending on
the speciﬁc research context. Second, I suggest that “resilience thinking” might beneﬁt
from a less vague conceptual framework and sketch a restructuring proposal.
4.1 The vagueness-precision trade-oﬀ in resilience research
I assume that extreme philosophical positions are untenable. Neither must all research
comply with the logical empiricists’ standards, nor is all research interdisciplinary, trans-
disciplinary and embedded in post-normal contexts. As Wittgenstein’s reasoning about
the (dis-)advantages of precise deﬁnitions indicates, a trade-oﬀ between vagueness and
precision exists. Vague deﬁnitions do accommodate a variety of cases but this comes
at the cost of reduced usefulness in particular cases. The arguments from Section 3
that add to this trade-oﬀ are summarized in Table 1. Whereas Hodges (2008b: 179)
recognizes a “dangerous trade-oﬀ between quantiﬁable operational deﬁnitions and mean-
ings understood in natural language”, I propose that this trade-oﬀ is mainly harmful
if its existence is not acknowledged and one side inadvertently dominates. A universal
balance between vagueness and precision is probably not achievable: careful use of con-
cepts distinguishes between situations where general concepts are appropriate and those
where precise concepts ﬁt better (Jax 2008). Furthermore, some of the methodological
arguments draw on fundamental issues that are not objectively reconcilable. Diﬀer-
ent philosophical points of view may lead to diverging appraisals of the same research
context. However, I conjecture that consciously approaching the trade-oﬀ and giving
explicit justiﬁcation for a particular solution should prevent excessive precision where
vague delimitations would be more appropriate and vice versa.
Some research contexts favor the arguments of traditional philosophy of science, oth-
ers favor the arguments attacking this traditional view. Especially the weights of the
traditional argument (P 3), requiring precision to ensure empirical testability, as well
as the counter-arguments (V 2), promoting vagueness to facilitate inter- and transdisci-
plinay communication and (V 3), focussing on problem-solving instead of puzzle-solving,
16precision vagueness
(P 1) scientiﬁc method (V 1) creativity
(P 2) establishing the validity of concepts (V 2) inter- and transdisciplinary communication
(P 3) empirical testability (V 3) problem-solving instead of puzzle-solving
Table 1: Summary of arguments from philosophy of science in favor of precision and
vagueness, respectively
are context-dependent. The research contexts may be distinguished with respect to their
degree of “normalcy”: In normal circumstances research takes place in a well-deﬁned
area, under a paradigm which includes the relevant problems (“puzzles”) as well the
methods that are regarded as adequate to their solution (Kuhn 1970). Here, the tra-
ditional call for empirical testability (P 3) is highly relevant. In contrast, contexts that
deviate from the normal situation of science as puzzle-solving favor post-normal argu-
ments. The argument for vagueness to promote transdisciplinary communication (V 2)
is more relevant when research is directly in touch with societal stakeholders. Yet it is
debatable wether conceptual precision itself inhibits communication or wether it is the
apologetic defense of a particular deﬁnition that poses an obstacle to common under-
standing. Precision should not hinder communication across disciplinary boundaries as
long as researchers are aware of other, equally legitimate meanings of concepts. Post-
normal situations, where decision stakes and uncertainty are high, also favor pragmatic
problem-solving (V 3). To achieve that aim, conceptual precision may be of less out-
standing importance than for normal puzzle-solving. Furthermore, conceptual vagueness
may be a sign that research in that particular area is just beginning and has not yet
reached the normal state (Hodges 2008a).
While some part of the vagueness-precision trade-oﬀ can be solved according to
the particular research context, another part of it concerns more general questions. The
traditional argument for strictly delimited concepts as precondition for establishing their
validity (P 2) and Feyerabend’s argument for vagueness as a source of creativity (V 1)
must be traded oﬀ. Both are relevant for all contexts of resilience research. Creativity
17may be a main concern in other-than-normal circumstances, where no paradigm is in
place, yet scientiﬁc progress generally is not conceivable without creativity. On the
other hand, generalization and validation of concepts is not only important to traditional
science contexts but also to transdisciplinary research if the latter does not content itself
with “counseling” (Hirsch Hadorn et al. 2006: 125). That is, some compromise must be
made between the call for valid statements and open space for creativity. Furthermore,
the question of whether and how to separate descriptive knowledge from normative
knowledge is a crucial issue and cannot be answered solely by reference to the research
context. While traditional philosophy of science emphasizes attention for the “hair-
line which separates science from faith” (Weber [1904] 1949: 110), post-normal science
disposes of the fact-value dichotomy (Funtowicz and Ravetz 2003). Wether evaluation
and description can be distinguished is a fundamental issue.
What does this mean for resilience research? Its contexts are certainly diverse.
Sometimes, it aims at solving fundamental questions, like understanding ecological in-
teractions in a speciﬁed setting, and sometimes it has transdisciplinary, non-epistemic
targets, such as improving outreach to societal actors. For instance, the Resilience Al-
liance’s project to assemble a database of thresholds and regime shifts in ecological and
social-ecological systems fundamentally depends on the falsiﬁability of key concepts in
empirical settings. Here, conceptual precision is a conditio sine qua non. In contrast,
some research approaches are explicitly directed at practitioners who are not bound to
any scientiﬁc standard. In delivering this transdisciplinary message, the traditional fo-
cus on rigor and precision may be dispensable. Furthermore, the initially metaphorical
concepts adaptive cycle and panarchy should never have entered the academic discourse
following the logical empiricists’ standards. Yet these metaphors are useful in that they
generate new research questions (Holling et al. 2002b). This might indicate that some
areas of resilience research have not yet reached a normal phase of puzzle-solving but
still constitute a situation that rewards creativity and fuzzyness more than precision
and rigor.
184.2 Resilience thinking
In my view, “resilience thinking” lacks a consistent balance between vagueness and
precision. Consider the two weaknesses of “resilience thinking” following Fischer et
al. (2009: 550). First, there is an “inherent weakness” to the perspective because it is
“potentially diﬃcult to apply to systems without identiﬁable alternate states”. Second, a
“weakness in practice” arises from the fact that “the term ‘resilience’ can appear vague to
policymakers and the general public”. If vagueness and precision were coherently traded
oﬀ, “resilience thinking” should not exhibit both weaknesses. Suppose researchers would
explicitly and consciously rely on a very vague notion of resilience (e.g., embrace change
and anticipate undesirable events). Then, the ﬁrst weakness should not pose a problem
because resilience is not coupled to the existence of multiple stability domains. Such
a vague notion of resilience could very well be applied to systems without identiﬁed
alternate states. In that case, of course, the term could appear vague to policymakers
and the general public. In contrast, suppose researchers would exclusively rely on a
narrow, precise concept of resilience, such as Holling’s (1973) “amount of disturbance a
system can absorb” as a one-dimensional measure, which is to be speciﬁed for particular
settings (e.g., distance groundwater-table to critical threshold in agricultural regions
prone to salinization, M¨ aler et al. 2007). Such a concise concept of resilience should not
run in danger of appearing vague to concerned policymakers and ecosystem managers. It
would not be applicable to systems without identiﬁed dynamics, thresholds and alternate
states, however.3 Either degree of precision has its drawbacks, but a research approach
that exhibits both weaknesses displays too much and not enough vagueness at the same
time.
As a further argument that “resilience thinking” displays inappropriate vagueness,
consider its mix of normative and descriptive aspects. It has been suggested that due to
an unduly amalgamation of evaluative and descriptive content, resilience runs the risk
3One might argue that there is no inherent weakness in the ﬁrst place since that concept is not meant
to be applicable to other systems. Yet the argument for vagueness as a source of creativity implies that
there lies a weakness in restricting resilience research to particular kinds of systems.
19of becoming too much like sustainability (Brand and Jax 2007). Sustainability consti-
tutes a “thick” concept with considerable normative content (Williams 1985) and a long
tradition as a guiding principle for ecosystem management (Grober 2010). It is widely
discussed, evoked and also contested. That is, sustainability has evolved into a buzzword
whose “plethora of meanings” and deﬁnitions draw heavy criticism: “This deﬁnitional
chaos has nearly rendered the term sustainability meaningless [...]” (Marshall and Toﬀel
2005: 1). Indeed, its positive connotation and the variety of meanings make sustain-
ability prone to inﬂationary use in dubious contexts. For instance, Shell advertises the
extraction of oil from Canada’s tar sands as a “sustainable” operation (The Economist
2008). I agree that by increasingly mixing positive and normative aspects, “resilience
thinking” also lends itself to ﬁgure as a buzzword. Should sustainability be permanently
excluded from the “resilience thinking” discourse, its normative content will be absorbed
by the concept of resilience. While inﬂuential papers (e.g., Walker et al. 2004) do men-
tion that resilience is – originally – a descriptive concept and resilient system states may
be undesirable from an anthropocentric perspective, the recent conceptual development
indicates an increase in resilience’s normative connotation (cf. Section 2.2). By contrast,
I would favor a way of framing “resilience thinking” that explicitly and separately in-
cludes a normative notion of sustainability. Whereas Weber’s “hair-line between science
and faith” might be a construct, I am not sure wether it is a good idea to completely
dismiss it.
Following these arguments, I suggest that the “resilience thinking” family of con-
cepts would beneﬁt from a restructuring. Speciﬁcally, I propose (i) an emphasis on the
descriptive side of resilience, (ii) a return to sustainability as the normative meta-goal of
resilience research and (iii) the use of adaptability and transformability as concepts that
represent human capabilities to manage resilience following the sustainability target.
I reckon that established deﬁnitions (Walker et al. 2004, Derissen et al. 2011, Hirsch
Hadorn et al. 2006) can be used to advance the conceptual framework of “resilience
thinking” in a coherent way.
(i),(ii) Derissen et al. (2011) employ resilience as a purely descriptive and sustainabil-
ity as a normative concept. They argue that sustainability comprises a society’s basic
20normative orientation, thereby providing a “sustainability set”. This set circumscribes
those future states which satisfy a society’s norms of intra- and intergenerational justice.
Wether a resilient system is also sustainable cannot be determined a priori. It depends
on the system’s location on the stability landscape with respect to the sustainability
set. Derissen et al.’s (2011) analysis implies that a social-ecological system is on a sus-
tainable path if and only if human actors are able to shape the stability landscape so
as to keep the system within the normatively given target set. Hence, (iii) adaptability
and transformability, deﬁned as the capabilities to inﬂuence resilience and devise new
system conﬁgurations (Walker et al. 2004) are preconditions for sustainability. While
Folke et al. (2010) add evaluative content to the concept of resilience, thereby establish-
ing a normative meta-goal “Earth-system resilience”, I would be more comfortable with
keeping the concept of resilience clear of evaluative content and subsuming all normative
considerations under the notion of sustainability. In short, my suggestion boils down
to the following relation: sustainability implies that social-ecological resilience can be
successfully managed through adaption and transformation.
There is a close structural similarity between my proposal and the categories of
knowledge in transdisciplinarity research, following the Swiss system approach (Pro-
Clim 1997). Hirsch Hadorn et al. (2006: 127) distinguish three diﬀerent categories of
knowledge:
i) Systems knowledge – Why and how do processes occur and where is change needed:
empirical level?
ii) Target knowledge – What are better practices (targets): purposive level?
iii) Transformation knowledge – How can existing practices be transformed: pragmatic
and normative level?
The correspondence, as summarized in Table 2, should be clear: resilience refers to em-
pirical knowledge about social-ecological systems (category i). Sustainability embodies
the normative considerations which system states are desirable and where change is
necessary (category ii). Adaptability and transformability refer to practical knowledge
about how to manage resilience and initiate transformations (category iii).
21concept in resilience thinking category in transdisciplinary research type of knowledge
resilience systems knowledge empirical
sustainability target knowledge purposive, normative
adaptability, transformability transformation knowledge pragmatic
Table 2: Correspondence of categories between resilience thinking and transdisciplinary
research
While my proposal slightly diﬀers from the systems understanding of Hirsch Hadorn
et al. (2006: 127) in that the second category (target knowledge) instead of the third cat-
egory (transformation knowledge) includes normative considerations, the crucial point
and main similarity is the separation of empirical category and purposive category (P 1).
Then again, my framework is also vague (e.g., it is compatible with multiple resilience
deﬁnitions and multiple views on transformations) in order to provide enough scope for
creativity (V 1). Depending on the speciﬁc research context, empirical testability (P
3) or pragmatic problem-solving (V 2,3) could be emphasized. In sum, a more struc-
tured “resilience thinking” framework accounts for the arguments of both vagueness and
precision.
Acknowledging that use of language does not follow prescription (Hodges 2008a), I
would like to stress that I do not claim to have established the ﬁnal, deﬁnite structure
of the “resilience thinking” family of concepts. Resilience is certainly a polysemous
concept with a variety of plausible meanings and structuring possibilities. However, this
does not rule out the use of a precisely structured resilience framework. As I understand
it, the arguments for conceptual vagueness imply that researchers should be aware of
legitimate other notions of resilience. They do not imply that every individual deﬁnition
or categorization must be vague. Conceptual precision is not a problem for inter- and
transdiscplinary communication and problem-solving as long as researchers acknowledge
the existence of a plurality of meanings and structuring possibilities. Hence, my proposal
should be seen as one way to structure “resilience thinking” more coherently.
225 Conclusion
A wide spectrum of resilience research exists. On the precise end of the spectrum,
research approaches rely on concise deﬁnitions and operationalizations, thereby estab-
lishing a polysemous concept of resilience. On the vague end of the spectrum, “resilience
thinking” builds on a vague cluster of concepts. Both extremes can draw on diﬀerent
arguments from philosophy of science. These arguments must be traded oﬀ in order to
ﬁnd an appropriate mix of vagueness and precision. A universal solution to the trade-oﬀ
does probably not exist. This is for two reasons. First, fundamental methodological
points of view cannot objectively be reconciled and second, diﬀerent research contexts
may call for individual degrees of vagueness. Thus, every particular research approach
should explicitly justify its balance of vagueness/precision in order to avoid inadvertent
and excessive domination of one side.
Assessing “resilience thinking”, I conclude that the approach fails to explicitly and
consistently trade oﬀ vagueness and precision. Rather, vagueness is implicitly priori-
tized: “Resilience is a broad, multifaced, and loosely organized cluster of concepts [...].
As long as resilience thinking produces interesting research ideas, people are likely to
pursue it. When it seems empty of ideas, it will be abandoned or transformed into
something else” (Carpenter and Brock 2008: 1). This view tacitly passes over the
arguments for conceptual precision. Therefore, I propose a restructuring of the “re-
silience thinking” family of concepts. By relating resilience, sustainability and adapt-
ability/transfomability in analogy to the approach of transdisciplinary research (Hirsch
Hadorn et al. 2006), I indicate how “resilience thinking” could balance vagueness and
precision in a more coherent way. In particular, I explicitly distinguish between descrip-
tive and normative content. This diﬀerentiation is crucial for those contexts of “resilience
thinking” that do rely on a separation of empirical knowledge and evaluation.
In sum, I oﬀer guidance for the further conceptual development of resilience research.
I sketch how conﬂicting arguments from philosophy of science can be productively em-
ployed to assess whether, in some speciﬁc research context, conceptual vagueness is an
asset or a liability. By analyzing “resilience thinking” and oﬀering a coherent restruc-
23turing proposal, I provide an example of how to improve trade-oﬀs between vagueness
and precision.
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